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I. INTRODUCTION
Antidumping laws are generally categorized as "unfair trade law,"
much like the countervailing duty laws. Notwithstanding their label, the
issue of whether antidumping laws truly function as import relief laws
targeting "unfair trade" has always been a source of never ending con-
troversy.1 Some argue that dumping is not unfair, whereas antidumping
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I. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 223-25 (1989); DOWN
IN THE DUMPS: ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNFAIR TRADE LAWS (Richard Boltuck & Robert E.
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law is unfair.2 Most of this controversy originates from the question of
whether antidumping laws can be justified from the perspective of com-
petition laws and policy.' For the past few decades, various international
forums have harbored a series of discussions concerning the relationship
between trade law and policy and competition law and policy. In particu-
lar, the conflict between antidumping laws and competition policy has
been the subject of close scrutiny under both the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD).
Against this background, a proposal to introduce an antidumping-type
discipline in the name of "pricing mechanisms" into the shipbuilding
market has emerged from the OECD as well.' In light of persistent
concerns about anticompetitive elements of the current antidumping
regime, it does not come as a surprise that similar concerns have been
raised against such a new proposal, allegedly to bring about normal
competitive conditions in the world for the shipbuilding industry.
Before looking into the contents of such a proposal, one should
consider the market conditions under which such a proposal emerges for
the shipbuilding industry. A note by the OECD Secretariat-General
summarizes the current market conditions of the shipbuilding industry:
There is a general consensus both within governments and in-
dustry that while the shipyards are enjoying something of a
building boom at present this is likely not to last, and the very
low prices that are the norm at the moment seem to indicate an
excess capacity that prevents prices from reflecting conditions of
high demand. It is suspected that many inefficient shipyards that
would have gone bankrupt in a well functioning market are con-
tinuing to operate with direct and indirect government support.
Litan eds., 1991); Seung Wha Chang, Reform of U.S. Antidumping Law Under the Multilat-
eral Trade System after the Uruguay Round (1994) (unpublished S.J.D. Dissertation, Harvard
University) (on file with Harvard University).
2. See, e.g., Robert W. McGee, The Case to Repeal the Antidumping Laws, 13 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 491 (1993).
3. See, e.g., Diane P. Wood, "Unfair" Trade Injury: A Competition-Based Approach,
41 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1155 n.7 (1989).
4. See, e.g., Org. Econ. Cooperation & Dev. [OECD], Trade and Competition Policies,
OECD/GD(92)98 (May 1992); World Trade Org. [WTO], Report[s] of the Working Group on
the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/2
(Dec. 8, 1998), WT/WGTCP/3 (Oct. 11, 1999), WT/WGTCP/4 (Nov. 20, 2000),
WT/WGTCP/5 (Oct. 8, 2001). In particular, the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference held in
November-December 2001 in Doha set the legal basis for launching negotiations on the inter-
action between trade and competition policy. WTO Ministerial Conference, Draft Ministerial
Declaration, WT/MIN(0l)/DEC/W/I (Nov. 14, 2001).
5. OECD Council, Negotiation of a New Shipbuilding Agreement, $ 11,
C(2002)125/REVI (June 6, 2001) (on file with author).
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There is therefore widespread consensus for the need to estab-
lish normal competitive conditions in the world's shipbuilding
and repair industry.6
While there may be differing views on present and future market
conditions and their policy implications, the market analysis safely sug-
gests that some mechanism under which only efficient shipbuilders can
survive the future downturn in the shipbuilding industry should be in
place. Such a mechanism, therefore, needs to address various factors that
distort the market.
Against this background, on September 12, 2002, the OECD Coun-
cil decided to launch negotiations on a new Shipbuilding Agreement to
bring about normal competitive conditions in the world's shipbuilding
and repair industry.
The key elements of the OECD Council's Mandate are as fol-
lows:
" Negotiations to bring about normal competitive condi-
tions in the world commercial shipbuilding and repair
industries are to be launched as soon as possible within
the context of the Council Working Party on Shipbuild-
ing, with a view to concluding a new Shipbuilding
Agreement by the end of 2005.
* The negotiations shall review and address market distort-
ing factors, in particular government support measures,
pricing and other practices which distort normal competi-
tive conditions in the world shipbuilding industry, as well
as mechanisms to deal with these.
" A Special Negotiating Group (SNG) was established for
an initial period ending 30 June 2004 for establishing
normal competitive conditions in shipbuilding.7
This is not the first attempt by the OECD members to try to reach an
agreement concerning the shipbuilding industry. Previous negotiations
culminated in the OECD Agreement Respecting Normal Competitive
Conditions in the Commercial Shipbuilding and Repair Industry of
6. Id. 4. For more detailed market analysis, see generally, OECD, Present Market
Conditions and Future Outlook for the World Shipbuilding Industry, CIWP6(2001)16 (Nov.
14, 2001) (on file with author).
7. OECD Special Negotiating Group [SNG], Negotiating Framework and Main Ele-
ments of a New Shipbuilding Agreement, 2, C/WP6/SNG(2002)1 (Sept. 24, 2002) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Negotiating Framework].
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1994.8 This Agreement took a very aggressive approach to addressing
factors that were deemed to distort market conditions. On the substantive
side, the 1994 Agreement provides for disciplines on government sup-
port measures and pricing practices, to be modeled after (with some
modifications) the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (SCM Agreement) and the WTO Antidumping Agreement,
respectively. In particular, the discipline of pricing practices called the
Injurious Pricing Code (IPC) was adopted, which resembles the WTO
Antidumping Agreement in many respects, but provides for stronger
remedies that are tailored for the shipbuilding industry.9 Nevertheless,
the 1994 Agreement did not come into force mainly because the U.S.
Congress failed to ratify it.
The same market distorting practices have persisted in the shipbuild-
ing industry thereafter. This motivated the OECD Council to adopt again
the Mandate as stated above and subsequently establish the SNG for this
particular negotiation. In support of the SNG's efforts, the Secretariat
issued a document that provides for a possible framework for negotia-
tions' ° and submitted three issue papers" to identify in detail mechanisms
to be included in the new Shipbuilding Agreement. In this document and
the three accompanying issue papers, the Secretariat suggested adopting
substantive rules for regulating both support measures and pricing prac-
tices. Not surprisingly, the Secretariat recommended that the 1994
Agreement form a useful and workable basis for the new Shipbuilding
Agreement. 2 The SNG held its first meeting on December 5-6, 2002,
and discussed the basic framework of the new Shipbuilding Agreement.
In the first meeting of the SNG, participants generally agreed that
government support measures are the main market-distorting factors in
the shipbuilding industry, and thus the need arises for an effective disci-
pline to deal with such government support measures. 3 However, with
8. OECD Council Working Party on Shipbuilding, Agreement Respecting Competitive
Conditions in the Commercial Shipbuilding and Repair Industry, C/WP6(94)5 (Oct. 3, 1994),
available at http://www.oecd.org [hereinafter 1994 Agreement].
9. A more detailed description of the IPC will be provided in Part II.
10. See Negotiating Framework, supra note 7, § 1.
11. OECD SNG, Support Measures, C/WP6/SNG(2002)2 (Sept. 24, 2002) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Support Measures]; OECD SNG, Distortive Pricing Practices,
C/WP6/SNG(2002)3 (Sep. 24, 2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter Distortive Pricing
Practices]; OECD SNG, Remedies and Dispute Settlement, C/WP6/SNG(2002)4 (Sept. 24,
2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter Remedies and Dispute Settlement].
12. Support Measures, supra note 11, T 17; Distortive Pricing Practices, supra note 11,
IT 13, 18.
13. The Secretariat's proposal for the basic principle concerning support measures is as
follows:
Principle Related to Support Measures: The objective of the new Agreement is to
prevent as many government support measures as possible, when these are specifi-
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respect to pricing practices, although many participants expressed the
need to have disciplines to deal with distortive pricing practices, whether
a pricing discipline should form a part of the Agreement remains an is-
sue for further consideration.' 4 The SNG's upcoming negotiation is set to
tackle this issue. 5 Proponents of this pricing discipline mainly claim that
a support measure discipline alone cannot eliminate a shipbuilding firm's
incentive to engage in short-term strategies of pricing that is too low.'6 In
contrast, others seem to argue that an effective discipline of government
support measures may sufficiently discourage shipbuilders from engag-
ing in distortive pricing practices,'7 and the OECD Secretariat draft
proposal' 8 based on the IPC may result in overregulation and is likely to
negatively affect innocent efficient shipbuilders who can sell at competi-
tively lower prices.
Under the current circumstances described above, it seems necessary
and timely appropriate to evaluate the Secretariat's proposed pricing
mechanisms since they are likely to become the starting point for further
negotiations." This Article undertakes this evaluation. 0 Although this
Article deals with issues specific to the shipbuilding industry, it has more
important systemic value for the world trading system. The proposed
pricing mechanism is the first attempt to have antidumping-type disci-
plines of low pricing practices in a specific sector, e.g., the shipbuilding
industry. This movement suggests that, once adopted, the new Shipbuild-
ing Agreement containing pricing disciplines would probably become a
cally provided directly or indirectly to the commercial shipbuilding and repair in-
dustry. Accordingly the definition of support measures should be as broad and
encompassing as possible, and any allowed measures should be limited and very
specific in scope.
Support Measures, supra note 11, T 3.
14. OECD SNG, On the Characteristics of the Shipbuilding Industry, at 4 (on file with
author) [hereinafter OECD SNG Meeting] (Chairman's summary of the first SNG meeting
held on December 5-6, 2002).
15. The second SNG meeting was held in April 2003. OECD SNG, Comments on Sup-
port Measures, at 1, C/WP6/SNG(2003)1 (March 4, 2003) (on file with author).
16. Distortive Pricing Practices, supra note 11, 2.
17. Id.
18. Strictly speaking, the current OECD Secretariat position in the above documents
cannot be considered its "proposal" since the Secretariat itself is not legally authorized to
make its own proposal. Nonetheless, since it explicitly suggests some substantive and proce-
dural rules for future negotiations, this Article refers to it as the "OECD Secretariat (draft)
proposal." In particular, when this Article discusses the Secretariat's proposal to adopt a pric-
ing discipline that is modeled after antidumping regulation, it will be called the "proposed
pricing mechanism(s)."
19. The Secretariat itself states that "[its] document provides a blueprint for the Agree-
ment, but the SNG will be free to add or delete issues, and to consider alternative ways of
dealing with them." Negotiating Framework, supra note 7, T 3.
20. Discussions of mechanisms dealing with government support measures are outside
the scope of this Article.
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future model for other sector-specific disciplines of low pricing prac-
tices. Therefore, an evaluation of the proposed pricing mechanisms
would be critical for the world trading system covering other industry
sectors as well as the shipbuilding industry.
The immediate goal of this Article is to examine whether the
proposed pricing mechanism truly adheres to the Mandate of the OECD
Council that authorizes negotiators to address pricing practices which
distort normal competitive conditions. Since the distortion of competitive
market conditions as such is undoubtedly a serious general concern
under competition laws and policy, this Article also focuses on whether
the proposed pricing mechanisms are justified under the standard of
competition laws and policy. This is particularly relevant due to the fact
that the antidumping regime, the origin of the proposed pricing
mechanisms, faces criticism from a competition policy perspective. The
main conclusion of this Article is that the proposed pricing mechanism
cannot be justified under competition policy standards and ultimately is
inconsistent with the OECD Council's Mandate. Therefore, the proposed
pricing mechanisms should not be considered as a viable option under
the Mandate. Other industry sectors of course are discouraged to take the
same route under the banner of "addressing market-distorting pricing
practices." Finally, this Article also shows why there is no strong need to
have alternative mechanisms to address pricing practices in the
shipbuilding industry, and suggests that negotiators focus on adopting
effective disciplines of government support measures, which are the
main culprits of market distorting factors in the shipbuilding industry.
This Article is organized in the following manner: Part II introduces
the OECD Secretariat's proposed pricing mechanisms based on the IPC
antidumping model, while Part III provides for a critical evaluation of
the proposed pricing mechanisms. First, Part III explains the reasons
why the IPC antidumping model does not fit the shipbuilding industry
due to the unique characteristic of the shipbuilding market. This Part
thereafter demonstrates why the antidumping regime, as well as the pro-
posed pricing mechanism, cannot be justified under the competition
policy standards. While criticizing defenses for the current antidumping
regime, Part III demonstrates why the proposed pricing mechanism may
result in overregulation and thus is inconsistent with the OECD Coun-
cil's Mandate. Part IV shows why candidates for market-distorting
pricing practices-for example, predatory/strategic dumping-are
unlikely to occur in the shipbuilding industry, and therefore there is no
strong need to have alternative mechanisms. While reconfirming that
antidumping-type pricing disciplines are inappropriate in the shipbuild-
ing industry, this Part cautiously introduces a competition law model and
[Vol. 24:807
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modified pricing mechanisms to directly target predatory/strategic
dumping or other types of market-distorting pricing practices. Part V
concludes with a brief summary of the foregoing analysis.
II. PROPOSED PRICING MECHANISMS
A. Defining "Distortive Pricing Practices"
The OECD Council's Mandate to the SNG with respect to pricing
practices, in particular, states that "'the negotiation of the new Agree-
ment shall review and address market distorting factors, in particular
[... ] pricing and other practices which distort normal competitive condi-
tions in the world shipbuilding industry, as well as mechanisms to deal
with these[J'. 2' As to what level of pricing would indeed impair normal
competitive conditions and hence be deemed "too low," the Secretariat's
proposal states that sales below the "normal value" of a ship by a foreign
shipbuilder should be sanctioned if they cause or threaten material injury
to the domestic industry.22 The principle proposed by the Secretariat in
determining which pricing practices should be covered by the new
Agreement is as follows:
Principle on Pricing Practices: The Special Negotiating Group
recognizes that the sale of commercial ships at less than their
normal value is to be condemned if it causes or threatens mate-
rial injury to a shipbuilding and repair industry, or materially
retards the establishment of a shipbuilding and repair industry, in
23the territories of participants to the Agreement.
It is apparent that this proposed approach is modeled after the cur-
rent GATT/WTO antidumping rules.24 Distortive pricing practices as
21. Distortive Pricing Practices, supra note 11, T 1.
22. Id. T 22.
23. Id.
24. Article VI(l) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 provides:
1. The contracting parties recognize that dumping, by which products of one
country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the
normal value of the products, is to be condemned if it causes or threatens ma-
terial injury to an established industry in the territory of a contracting party or
materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry. For the purposes
of this Article, a product is to be considered as being introduced into the
commerce of an importing country at less than its normal value, if the price of
the product exported from one country to another
(a) is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the
like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country, or
(b) in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either
Spring 2003]
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interpreted under this proposal would in effect constitute "dumping" in
the sense of WTO antidumping rules.25 As noted previously, this proposal
is not a new concept, but is based on the IPC contained in Annex III of
the 1994 Agreement.26 For the "Determination of Injurious Pricing," Ar-
ticle 2 of the IPC provides:
2.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a vessel is to be consid-
ered as being injuriously priced, i.e., sold directly or indirectly to
one or more nationals or companies of another Party, or to one
or more companies owned or controlled by such nationals or
companies, at less than its normal value, if the export price of
the vessel sold is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary
course of trade, for the like vessel when sold to a buyer of the
exporting country.
2.2 When there are no sales of the like vessel in the ordinary
course of trade in the domestic market of the exporting country
or when, because of the particular market situation, such sales
do not permit a proper comparison, the margin of injurious pric-
ing shall be determined by comparison with a comparable price
of the like vessel when exported to an appropriate third country
provided that this price is representative. If such sales to any ap-
propriate third country do not exist or do not permit a proper
comparison, the margin of injurious pricing shall be determined
by comparison with the cost of production in the country of ori-
gin plus a reasonable amount for administrative, selling and
general costs and for profits.27
(i) the highest comparable price for the like product for export to any
third country in the ordinary course of trade, or
(ii) the cost of production of the product in the country of origin plus a
reasonable addition for selling cost and profit.
Due allowance shall be made in each case for differences in conditions and terms of
sale, for differences in taxation, and for other differences affecting price compara-
bility.*
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. VI(l), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1 (1994), 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter
GATT].
25. See infra note 28.
26. The Secretariat expressed its view that "there are strong conceptual reasons to base
[a pricing discipline], with the necessary fine-tuning, upon the Injurious Pricing Code." Dis-
tortive Pricing Practices, supra note 11, T 18.
27. 1994 Agreement, supra note 8, Annex III, at 29.
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The wording of the relevant provisions closely resembles that of the
WTO Antidumping Agreement) 8
B. Modification of Antidumping Rules
Since "pricing practices" is essentially another term for "dumping,"
questions may arise as to why the WTO Antidumping Agreement cannot
address distortive pricing practices in the shipbuilding industry. While it
is true that the WTO Antidumping Agreement deals with low pricing
practices similar to those faced by the shipbuilding industry, the WTO
Antidumping Agreement proves to be an ineffective mechanism when
applied to the shipbuilding market. The Secretariat describes such obsta-
cles as follows.
First of all, the antidumping discipline presupposes a series of goods
to be produced so that trade remedies can be applied to future imports of
those goods so as to prevent further injury to the local industry. Ships are
rarely produced, however, in series and exported to buyers in the same
country. Furthermore, "ships are large capital investments and buyers
rarely purchase multiple units ... [thereby generally making it impossi-
ble] to apply antidumping duties to future sales."29 Secondly, since ships
are rarely imported for sale and are normally registered under the flag of
a third country (so-called "open register"), it is difficult to apply the no-
tion of "importing," which is generally presumed in an antidumping
action.3° Lastly, whether or not injury in the market may arise from the
sale of a single ship at below normal value, a buyer rarely purchases a
28. For the determination of dumping, article 2 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement
provides:
2.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a product is to be considered as being
dumped, i.e. introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its nor-
mal value, if the export price of the product exported from one country to another is
less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product
when destined for consumption in the exporting country.
2.2 When there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade in
the domestic market of the exporting country or when, because of the particular
market situation or the low volume of the sales in the domestic market of the ex-
porting country, such sales do not permit a proper comparison, the margin of
dumping shall be determined by comparison with a comparable price of the like
product when exported to an appropriate third country, provided that this price is
representative, or with the cost of production in the country of origin plus a reason-
able amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits.
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994, art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IA, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 (citation omitted).
29. OECD SNG, Distortive Pricing Practices, supra note 11, 6.
30. Id. T 7.
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similar vessel from the same producer in the short term.' Thus, imposing
antidumping duties would only rarely be able to affect future ship sales,
and, as a consequence, would not provide effective protection for the
local industry.
In an attempt to overcome such limitations, the Secretariat suggests
that an injurious pricing discipline based on the 1994 IPC would provide
a plausible mechanism for the shipbuilding industry. While the IPC is
based on the philosophy and approach of the WTO Antidumping
Agreement, it has been significantly modified (or rather strengthened) to
make it suitable to the shipbuilding industry. For example, the IPC
directly targets the specific shipbuilder that has caused the injury,
something that the WTO Antidumping Agreement cannot do. By
imposing a charge on the shipbuilder in the first instance and eventually
denying on-loading/off-loading privileges of vessels constructed by the
same shipbuilder if the charge were to be ignored, the IPC attempts to
address problems that arise from the nonserial production element of the
shipbuilding market.3 This element of the IPC is fully carried over to the
Secretariat's proposal.
III. A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED
PRICING MECHANISMS
A. Structural Problems of Antidumping- Type
Disciplines in the Shipbuilding Industry
Serious problems may arise when applying quasi-antidumping disci-
plines to the shipbuilding market. The shipbuilding market has the
characteristics of a "single market." In other words, there are no "sanctu-
ary" domestic markets in which a shipbuilder could enjoy dominating
market power which would in turn enable the shipbuilder to cut prices in
a separate foreign market. This unique nature of the shipbuilding indus-
try suggests that a quasi-antidumping discipline, such as pricing
mechanisms, is an inappropriate means to deal with distortive pricing
practices.34
In addition, the made-to-order nature of the shipbuilding industry
makes it difficult to enforce pricing mechanisms. As each ship is molded
according to each buyer's preferences, no two ships are identical or even
31. Id. T 8.
32. Id. 9U 8-9.
33. Id. I 1.
34. Governmental support measures (subsidies) may enable a shipbuilder to cut prices
in export markets. However, this concern can be dealt with by another mechanism to directly
address government support measures, rather than pricing mechanisms.
[Vol. 24:807
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like products. Naturally ship prices differ from buyer to buyer. This
characteristic of the shipbuilding industry generates a significant prob-
lem in enforcing the injurious pricing mechanism because, under the
antidumping model disciplines, discrimination is to be condemned only
when it is taking place between "like vessels." In this sense, price differ-
ences that arise from meeting buyers' specific preferences do not, in and
of themselves, equal distortive pricing practices.
This lack of "like vessels" would lead the enforcement agency to re-
sort to the so-called "constructed value" method that eventually targets
below-cost sales. This constructed value approach also seems to have
inherent problems when applied to pricing practices in the shipbuilding
industry. For instance, the proposed pricing disciplines would target a
specific ship manufacturer in the middle of such manufacturing process
in light of the fact that it normally takes quite a long time period to con-
struct a ship and an alleged injury to a competitive bidder may already
have occurred during that period. At that early stage, it would appear
impossible to calculate actual manufacturing costs: only estimated costs
are a possible option, and this method is not without a significant margin
of error. Therefore, one can forcefully argue that it would be inappropri-
ate to condemn pricing practices in the shipbuilding market on the basis
of the constructed value approach.35
In sum, due to the unique characteristics of the shipbuilding industry,
those pricing disciplines that are structurally similar to antidumping-type
disciplines, even if modified, would not fit the shipbuilding industry. It
would be tantamount to putting a square peg into a round hole. This is
the first and most immediate reason why the proposed pricing mecha-
nisms cannot be a viable option under the Council Mandate.
B. Competition Policy and Antidumping Regimes
(Pricing Mechanisms)
The antidumping regime, viewed from the perspective of
competition policy, is one of the most extensively scrutinized subjects in
the literature addressing the interaction between trade and competition.36
Antidumping law provides for trade remedies that protect domestic
producers, while competition law purports to protect the interests of
35. In Section IV.A, this Article also addresses why condemning below-cost sales under
the antidumping regime is inappropriate.
36. This discussion formally took place at the WTO Working Group on Trade and
Competition Policies Concerning the Relationship Between Trade and Competition Policy
(WTO WGTCP). See WTO WGTCP, Report on the Meeting of 27 and 28 November 1997,
1 4-7, WT/WGTCP/M/3 (Feb. 26, 1998).
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consumers.37 If antidumping law is enforced against low-priced imports
that are not harmful to competition in the importing market, a conflict
necessarily arises between these two regimes.38 A multitude of empirical
studies demonstrate there is a high probability that antidumping
measures maintain or even aggravate uncompetitive conditions in
domestic markets and thus produce anticompetitive effects.39 In addition,
no one can deny that antidumping regimes inherently have
anticompetitive elements.40 For example, the mere fact that an
antidumping action has been brought may induce buyers to renege their
business dealings with respondents due to the procedural difficulties that
normally accompany such legal action. In addition, when viewed from
the perspective of competition policy, "price undertaking" condoned by
antidumping regimes as an alternative remedy is nothing more than
another form of price fixing. Moreover, it is widely accepted that the
present antidumping regime is, more often than not, subject to abuse as a
41means of protectionism . Current antidumping laws and practices are
also problematic when considering their implication for the global
welfare as well as the consumer welfare of the importing country.42
The OECD Committee on Competition Law and Policy has exten-
sively discussed the problematic aspects of the antidumping regime from
the perspective of competition policy. 43 In particular, under the auspices
of the OECD Working Party on Competition and International Trade,
Professor Robert Willig analyzed current antidumping regimes from the
competition perspective and reached a solid conclusion that "antidump-
ing policy has for the most part been protective of domestic suppliers
and has by and large distorted rather than protected competition." His
conclusion was also supported by empirical studies of antidumping
measures under four major national antidumping laws (those of the
37. For a U.S. Supreme Court case on this point, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
38. Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, Dumping, Antidumping and Antitrust,
J. WORLD TRADE, Feb. 1996, at 5, 29; Robert P. Rogers, The Illusionary Conflict Between
Antidumping and Antitrust: A Comment, 19 ANTITRUST BULL. 369, 370-74 (1974).
39. See, e.g., William Davey, Antidumping Laws: A Time for Restriction, in 1988
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 8-1 (Barry Hawk ed., 1989).
40. See Harvey Applebaum, The Anti-Dumping Laws-Impact on the Competitive
Process, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 590, 601 (1974).
41. See generally DOWN IN THE DUMPS: ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNFAIR TRADE
LAWS, supra note 1; JAMES BOVARD, FAIR TRADE FRAUD (1991); J. MICHAEL FINGER, ANTI-
DUMPING LAW: HOW IT WORKS AND WHO GETS HURT (1993).
42. See Robert D. Willig, The Economic Effects of Anti Dumping Policy, in OECD,
Competition Policy and Antidumping, at 45, DAFFE/CLP/WPI (96)4 (Apr. 1, 1996).
43. See, e.g., id.
44. Robert Willig, Economic Effects of Antidumping Policy, in BROOKINGS TRADE Fo-
RUM 57, 78 (Robert D. Lawrence ed., 1998). This 1998 paper is almost identical to his report
submitted to the OECD in 1996, except that a more concrete concluding section was added.
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United States, E.U., Canada, and Australia); more than 90 percent of
antidumping measures are not justified under the competition policy
standard.45
Of course, the WTO has also considered this issue. In 1996 at the
Singapore Ministerial Conference, a Working Group on the Interaction
between Trade and Competition Policy was established as a forum for
discussing this interaction. In this forum, several countries argued that
the current antidumping regime is inconsistent with competition policy
and therefore should be abolished or substituted by competition law, or if
not, be amended so as to conform to competition policy concerns.46
Since the proposed injurious pricing mechanism is modeled after the
current antidumping rules, the same concerns may arise. This is particu-
larly troublesome because the proposed injurious pricing mechanism is
allegedly designed to contribute to reestablishing normal competitive
conditions. Ordinarily, this can be accomplished by injecting "free and
fair competition" into the market, and therefore a typical tool to this end
would be to enforce competition law and policy. Accordingly, a proposed
regime that cannot be justified under the competition policy standard
would in all likelihood fail to accomplish the goal of reestablishing nor-
mal competitive conditions. Even the 1994 Agreement took the same
position on this point: Governmental measures that authorize, encourage
or require shipbuilders to enter into anticompetitive arrangements are
"inconsistent with normal competitive conditions.4 7 This is the second
45. Id.
46. WTO WGTCP, Communication from Japan: The Impact of Trade Policy on
Competition, WT/WGTCP/W/92 (July 27, 1998); WTO WGTCP Communication from the
Republic of Korea: The Impact of State Monopolies, Exclusive Rights and Regulatory Policies
on Competition and International Trade: Korea's Recent Experience and Suggestions,
WT/WGTCP/W/91 (Aug. 31, 1998); WTO WGTCP Communication from Hong Kong,
China: Item 2(a): Impact of State Monopolies, Exclusive Rights and Regulatory Policies on
Competition and International Trade, WT/WGTCP/W/94 (Aug. 31, 1998). Only the United
States expressed a dissenting view. See WTO WGTCP Submission of the United States:
Observations on the Distinctions between Competition Law and Antidumping Rules, at 1,
WT/WGTCP/W/88 (July 27, 1997) [hereinafter Submission of the United States]. The next
Section responds to this view.
47. Annex I of the Agreement reads, in relevant part:
The following measures of support are inconsistent with normal competitive condi-
tions when specifically provided, directly or indirectly, to the commercial
shipbuilding and repair industry by a Party... in any form:
C. Official Regulations and Practices
1. Administrative acts, guidance, or practices which authorise, encourage or require
shipbuilders or ship repairers to enter into anti-competitive arrangements with
competitors including but not limited to agreements to fix prices, rig bids, allocate
markets, restrain production or sales, or engage in predatory practices.
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reason why the proposed pricing mechanism cannot be a viable option
under the Council's Mandate.
C. Unfounded Defenses for the Antidumping Regime
When WTO Members considered the conflict between antidumping
and competition policy, the United States put forward two major argu-
ments in defense of the current antidumping rules. In essence, the United
States argued that the antidumping regime has its own justifiable reasons
to exist, regardless of its anticompetitive consequences. Since the pro-
posed pricing mechanism for shipbuilding is a progeny of the
antidumping rules, it is necessary to examine whether the U.S. defenses
are valid and applicable here.
1. Multilateral Trading System Defense
The first U.S. defense for the current antidumping rules is that they
provide for trade remedies agreed to by the WTO Members and are
therefore necessary for the maintenance of the multilateral trading sys-
tem. According to this argument, without the existence of such trade
remedies, no agreement on broader GATT and WTO packages of mar-
ket-opening agreements could have been made.4 '8 This argument
apparently concedes that the antidumping regime might not be justified
as a stand-alone agreement.
In any event, this argument cannot justify the establishment of new
quasi-antidumping rules for the shipbuilding industry under the umbrella
of the OECD, rather than the WTO. Even if trade remedy rules were in-
tended to ensure that the balance struck under the multilateral trade
system would not be impaired, such logic would not be applicable to
pricing mechanisms. This is because the new Shipbuilding Agreement is
not a part of the WTO system, and would not involve balancing conces-
sions in other matters of trade due to its focus on a single sector.
Transforming conventional antidumping disciplines into a more rigorous
form of pricing mechanisms for use solely in the shipbuilding industry is
not compatible with this balancing-of-interests argument.
1994 Agreement, supra note 8, Annex 1, at 13, 16 (Measures of Support Inconsistent with
Normal Competitive Conditions in the Commercial Shipbuilding and Repairing Industry)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).
48. Submission of the United States, supra note 46, at 2.
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2. "Level Playing Field" Defense
The United States also argued that antidumping rules represent an
effort to maintain a "level playing field ' 49 among producers in different
countries. Antidumping duties are designed to offset, quantitatively, the
artificial advantages realized by the exporting country's producers. Con-
sequently, producers in the importing country may compete, at least in
the importing country's market, on equal footing with the exporting
country's producers. ° Because competition is unfair whenever foreign
producers enjoy artificial advantages created by their governments that
are not equally available to domestic producers,5' antidumping measures
should be seen as a means of helping create a level playing field.
According to this argument, impairment of the level playing field may
result from either government industrial policies or practices which pro-
vide artificial advantages to home market producers, or from differences
in national economic systems. 2
Addressing first the latter point about different economic systems,
these differences may indeed result in pricing differences. Yet, this does
not always imply that such pricing is a result of government-induced
unfair competition. For instance, labor policies may differ from State to
State and such divergence may have its roots in different cultural and
social backgrounds. If the simple fact of differences in economic sys-
tems can be sufficient grounds for retaliatory trade measures, foreign
shipbuilders may be punished for merely operating in different cultural
or social environments. The economic climate of a given country may be
warmer than another country, but that does not mean that all of that cli-
mactic warmth stems from unfair artificial advantages and therefore
causes market distortion. 3 In addition, the existence of different eco-
nomic systems as a rationale for antidumping laws arguably made more
sense when non-market economies were more common. Since they are
less common now, the basic rationale for that argument has disappeared.
For all of these reasons, an argument based on differences between eco-
nomic systems also fails.
49. Id. at 3. According to the level-playing-field concept, a government should offer the
same treatment to the domestic industry as that accorded to foreign industries by their gov-
ernments.
50. Id. at 3; WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Communication from the United States:
Basic Concepts and Principles of the Trade Remedy Rules, at 4, TN/RL/W/27 (Oct. 22, 2002).
51. Robert E. Hudec, Differences in National Environmental Standards: The Level-
Playing-Field Dimension, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1996). For a discussion of the "fair
trade" concept in relation to the "level-playing-field" notion, see Phedon Nicolaides, How Fair
Is Fair Trade?, 21 J. WORLD TRADE LAW 147, 155 (1987).
52. Submission of the United States, supra note 46, at 8-15.
53. For the same line of criticisms, see .WTO WGTCP, Communication from Japan:
Response to US Views on Anti-dumping, at 1, WT/WGTCP/W/123 (May 28, 1999).
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As for the former point involving different industrial policies, it is
true that government policies or practices may impair normal competi-
tive conditions by bestowing artificial advantages to home market
producers and tilting the level playing field. 4 This seems to be especially
likely in the shipbuilding industry as it is generally accepted that there
are widespread government support measures in place for domestic
shipyards.55 Nonetheless, a critical flaw of this argument is that under the
current antidumping procedures (and the proposed pricing mechanism)
no account is taken of this issue of whether the challenged low pricing is
associated with artificial advantages (e.g., home market access restric-
tions).56 Instead, the relationship between pricing and distortion of
market conditions is simply assumed. While artificial advantages may
lead to dumping in the form of price discrimination or below-cost sales,
this low pricing need not always be accompanied by artificial advan-
tages. Price discrimination or below-cost sales may occur even when
producers do not enjoy artificial advantages, as shown below.
The new theory of dumping shows that international price discrimi-
nation practices are in many instances normal business practices
responding to market fluctuations.57 For example, the exporter's home
market may be insulated from possibly unstable world markets. If the
world market experiences a slack in demand, the exporter will have to
charge a lower price in order to remain in the export market. This gener-
ates international price discrimination, even without the existence of a
governmental protection of a monopolistic home market. 8 This is en-
tirely a "natural phenomenon," and lacks any artificial advantages.59
The same is true for below-cost sales. A systematic analysis of
dumping in the form of below-cost sales only emerged for the first time
in the 1980s, since the early literature on dumping focused entirely on
54. Economists as well as legal scholars generally agree that a government's granting of
artificial advantages may tilt the level playing field and thereby cause market distortions and
unfair trade. See, e.g., JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 34, 35 (1988); PAUL KRUGMAN,
RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL TRADE 191-97 (1990); George Kleinfeld, A Critical Evaluation
of U.S. Fair Trade Policy, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 515, 517 (1985).
55. Again, this is the reason why effective disciplines of government support measures
should be adopted under the new Shipbuilding Agreement.
56. Hoekman & Mavroidis, supra note 38, at 30.
57. See, e.g., Satya P. Das, Market Uncertainties and Cyclical Dumping, 36 EUR. ECON.
REv. 71 (1992).
58. Phedon Nicolaides, The Competition Effects of Dumping, J. WORLD TRADE, Oct.
1990, at 118.
59. The emergence of the new economic theory of price discrimination actually con-
tributed to benign neglect of the U.S. Robinson-Patman Act, an anti-price discrimination law.
See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 516 (3d ed. 1990) (showing that the U.S. Federal Trade Commission enforcement
of Robinson-Patman Act declined sharply from seventy-four complaints per year on average in
1961-1965, 5.6 per year in 1966-1970, and to less than one per year between 1975 and 1986).
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price discrimination. Recent studies show that, except for predatory
dumping, there are several "fair" business reasons for a firm to sell be-
low cost. First, below-cost sales may occur when there are fluctuations
in export markets.60 Second, a firm may sell at below cost when it is nec-
essary to schedule production before prices are known, and production
costs are already sunk when prices become known.6' Third, sales below
cost would also occur if a firm attempted to maximize sales rather than
profit.62 This may happen when managers are rewarded in part in propor-
tion to the gross sales volume, rather than purely on profit. Finally, a
firm may sell below cost when it finds it advantageous to build a market
share, as part of modem marketing practices. These sales may be seen as
a kind of investment: "expenses undertaken today in return for the future
profits that will derive from a larger market share. 63 This is also a nor-
mal method of competition for all firms in the market and has its fair
business rationales. 64 In sum, these pricing practices are "entirely consis-
tent with robustly competitive conditions in the importing nation's
market,' 65 and therefore in no sense distort such conditions.
To summarize, the first defense for the antidumping rules is not ap-
plicable to the pricing mechanisms. The level-playing-field defense also
fails for the above reasons-for example, an unwarranted assumption of
artificial advantages. Therefore, the current antidumping rules cannot
serve as a good model for new mechanisms to address low pricing prac-
tices which distort competitive conditions in the shipbuilding market.
D. Overregulating Features of the Pricing Mechanisms
The foregoing observation also leads to another concern: that the
proposed injurious pricing mechanism may result in overregulation. The
60. Roger D. Blair & Leonard Cheng, On Dumping, 50 S. ECON. J. 857, 858 (1984).
For an empirical study that supports this theory, see Susan Hutton & Michael Trebilcock, An
Empirical Study of the Application of Canadian Antidumping Laws: A Search for Normative
Rationales, J. WORLD TRADE, June 1990, at 123, 127.
61. Alan Deardorff, Economic Perspectives on Antidumping Law, in ANTIDUMPING
LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 33 (John H. Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst eds.,
1989). This theory is also supported by an empirical study. See Hutton & Trebilcock, supra
note 60, at 128.
62. See, e.g., Stephen W. Davies & Anthony J. McGuiness, Dumping at Less than Mar-
ginal Cost, 12 J. INT'L EcON. 169, 169-70 (1982).
63. Deardorff, supra note 61, at 37.
64. Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 47 (1982) (observing that
existing firms are willing to sell below marginal cost in order to maintain existing firms' ad-
vantages such as lower real costs of transacting, industry-specific investment, or a reputable
history); George Yarrow, Economic Aspects of Antidumping Policies, 3 OXFORD REV. EcON.
POL'Y 66, 71 (1987) (conjecturing that, even though dumping is costly, it is undertaken for the
purpose of acquiring a reputation of being a "tough" competitor).
65. Willig, supra note 44, at 66.
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pricing mechanisms exist on the basis of the general assumption that
pricing below normal value (either price discrimination or pricing below
costs) automatically involves distortion of normal competitive condi-
tions. In other words, the pricing mechanisms simply assume the
existence of artificial advantages bestowed upon shipbuilders which en-
able them to cut prices and thereby distort competitive conditions, if
pricing practices fit the definition of injurious pricing under the proposed
pricing mechanism, as modeled after the antidumping rules.
Such an assumption is wrong. As noted above, price discrimination
or sales below costs may occur for several reasons even when there are
no artificial advantages granted to shipbuilders. Therefore, the proposed
injurious pricing mechanism may, in effect, sanction efficient shipbuild-
ers' innocent pricing practices that are fair business practices under
normal competitive conditions. In light of the fact that price discrimina-
tion or below-cost pricing is, more often than not, a fair and normal
business practice, the proposed pricing mechanism cannot be justified
since it apparently lacks a filtering process through which only market-
distorting pricing practices are disciplined.66
The proposed pricing mechanisms are allegedly aimed at disciplin-
ing pricing that is unfairly "too low. ' ' 67 Nonetheless, the OECD Council's
Mandate does not authorize negotiators to address "too low" pricing, but
rather market-distorting pricing practices. What is the objective and sci-
entific criteria by which one can condemn certain low pricing practices
as being "too low"? The IPC as well as the newly proposed mechanism
indicates nothing about such criteria, except that it equates "too low"
with "below normal value." As noted, however, there is no economic ra-
tionale for blaming "too low" pricing for the mere reason that it is below
"normal value" as defined by the antidumping rules. The foregoing sur-
vey of economic literature forcefully demonstrates that sales below
normal value (either price discrimination or below-cost sales) have justi-
fiable business reasons in many instances and are normal business
practices rather than "market-distorting practices."
Therefore, an application of the proposed pricing mechanism would
be likely to result in overregulation, and be inconsistent with the Council
Mandate that authorizes negotiators to address market-distorting prac-
tices only. This overregulating feature is a third reason why the pricing
mechanisms are not acceptable as a viable option under the Mandate, as
a means of addressing distortive pricing practices in the shipbuilding
industry.
66. This problem is not unique to the pricing mechanisms for the shipbuilding industry;
rather it is generally applicable to the antidumping rules.
67. See Distortive Pricing Practices, supra note 11, 1 22.
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IV. ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS
The foregoing analysis provides at least three reasons to reject the
proposed pricing mechanisms: structural problems, its inconsistency
with competition policy, and its overregulating features. The question
logically arises whether it is necessary to have any alternative mecha-
nisms to deal with market-distorting pricing practices in shipbuilding. To
answer this question, another question must be answered first: Do mar-
ket-distorting low pricing practices exist in the shipbuilding market?
Only if the answer to this latter question is in the affirmative, does it be-
come necessary to answer the former question. Again, if the answer to
the former question is positive, only then need this Article suggest alter-
native mechanisms.
A. Distortive Pricing Practices in the Shipbuilding Market?
The author does not generally deny the possible existence of low
pricing practices that may result in market distortions. According to Pro-
fessor Robert Willig's study conducted under the auspice of the OECD
Working Party on Competition and International Trade, there are two
examples of low pricing practices (dumping) that may distort competi-
tive conditions of the market and cannot be justified under the
competition policy standard: predatory dumping and strategic dumping.
Predatory Dumping: This is quite a well-known concept under com-
petition law and policy. Predatory dumping is the term applied to low
pricing where the seller intends to drive rivals out of the market in order
to obtain monopolistic power in the importing market. Short-term losses
from below-cost sales are expected to be recouped later from the high
prices, made possible from the exporter's monopolistic position obtained
following the rivals' irreversible exit from the importing market. 6 Sev-
eral strict conditions are required for this preying to occur: the prices
must be below cost (such as variable, incremental, or marginal costs),
and the firm must have the intention to prey by inducing the exit of its
rivals. Under these conditions, the firm should be able to gain a monopo-
listic position in the market. In addition, the monopolistic prices must be
high enough to recoup early losses from below-cost sales. Finally, there
should be market entry barriers against any possible entries by the firm's
old or potential rivals.69
68. Willig, supra note 44, at 65-66.
69. Id. at 74-75. For a U.S. Supreme Court's ruling on the required conditions for
predatory pricing, see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
For a European Court of Justice ruling, see Case 62/86, Akzo Chemie BV v. Commission
1986 E.C.R. 1503 (1986). Although the latter differs slightly in methodologies for assessing a
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Strategic Dumping: Strategic dumping is the term invented by
Robert Willig, which is injurious low pricing by an exporter whose home
market is foreclosed to foreign competition and thus enjoys the advan-
tage conferred by such protection.70 According to Willig, the production
of the good in question requires substantial investment in research and
development or other fixed costs, or involves significant learning-by-
doing, so that there are very important static or dynamic economies of
scale.' Theoretically, if the exporter's home market is foreclosed to for-
eign rivals, and if each independent exporter's share of their home
market is of significant size in relation to the rest of the relevant world
market, then as a consequence with all other things being equal, the ex-
porters will have a significant cost advantage over any foreign rivals.72
For strategic dumping to occur, several conditions must be satisfied:
(i) the home market of the exporter is protected; (ii) there are important
static or dynamic economies of scale in the supply of the product;
(iii) exclusion from the home market of the exporters can significantly
affect rival suppliers; and (iv) it is likely that exclusion from the home
market of the exporters disadvantages rival suppliers in relation to the
exporters.73 Only if all of these conditions are met may strategic dumping
distort the competition and create profitable market power.1
4
Predatory/strategic dumping may cause distortions of market com-
petitive conditions, and in that sense can be argued as unfairly "too low"
pricing. Then, a relevant question arises: Do such market-distorting pric-
ing practices exist in the shipbuilding market? There are no empirical
studies to answer this question.75 In theory, there would seem to be little
room for predatory/strategic dumping to occur in the shipbuilding indus-
try. First, it is well known that predatory pricing rarely occurs in the
international context. 6 The emergence of a series of new entrants in the
shipbuilding industry for the past several decades strongly indicates that
the shipbuilding market lacks any significant barriers to market entry.
Since it is a single worldwide market which is not yet dominated by any
single firm or country, it seems impossible for any single government or
monopolistic position, it resembles the former in requiring all other conditions (e.g., an aver-
age variable cost test and market (re)entry barriers).
70. Willig, supra note 44, at 64.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 72.
74. Id. at 64-65.
75. The OECD Secretariat stated that no actual examples of anticompetitive measures
had been found in the shipbuilding industry. See Letter from Wolfgang Hubner, Head of Divi-
sion of Transport, OECD, to SNG Participants, Other Trade Distorting Practices,
STI/DOT/03.18 (Jan. 22, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hubner Letter].
76. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. 574, 592 (1986).
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even a coalition of governments in a collusive manner, to establish an
official entry barrier. In other words, the shipbuilding market is very
unlikely to become monopolistic, and therefore there is a very low risk
of predatory pricing behavior in the market.77 The same is true for strate-
gic dumping. For instance, one of the critical conditions for strategic
dumping-sizable home-market foreclosure-cannot be satisfied due to
shipbuilding's unique single-market characteristic. 8
Therefore, the answer to the above question is that preda-
tory/strategic dumping-distortive "too low" pricing-is unlikely to
occur in the shipbuilding market.
B. Alternative Mechanisms
The foregoing analysis suggests that there is no strong need to adopt
alternative mechanisms to address pricing practices in the shipbuilding
industry and that the currently proposed mechanism may even be harm-
ful. In light of the undisputed fact that government support measures are
the main source of distortions of the shipbuilding market, focusing on
adopting effective disciplines on government support measures might be
a sound and efficient approach. While not denying that fact, the Secre-
tariat expressed the view that a pricing mechanism and a subsidy
(support measures) discipline address somewhat different concerns, and
thus eliminating government support measures will not remove all incen-
tives for short-term strategies of pricing below normal value.79 Again, the
fundamental flaw of this view lies in its erroneous assumption that "pric-
ing below normal value" is automatically market-distortive.
77. A recent Secretariat study also acknowledged that "monopolistic actions are
probably difficult (even if not impossible) in the shipbuilding market" OECD SNG, A
Pricing Discipline for the Shipbuilding Agreement: An Economic Perspective, 13,
C/WP6/SNG(2003)4 (Mar. 20, 2003). This study, however, suggests that pricing practices in
the shipbuilding industry that cause injury to a domestic industry may be "predatory in intent
and effect, but not predatory in [competition] law in that jurisdiction." Id. 21. Here, the Se-
cretariat erroneously equates the term "predatory" with "injury to a competitor." Willig points
out that the "injury" requirement under the antidumping policy does not generally coincide
with a requirement of predatory practice; to qualify as "predatory" a low pricing must meet all
of the strict structural conditions summarized above. Willig, supra note 44, at 74-75. In addi-
tion, although the shipbuilding industry is a classic high fixed-cost industry, predatory pricing
may occur only when the price is set at least below average variable cost, which makes high
fixed costs irrelevant to the finding of predatory pricing.
78. The Secretariat argues that "heavy government support" to shipbuilders may re-
place the requirement of "protected home market." Hubner Letter, supra note 75. However, the
existence of government support measures would not guarantee that all other conditions for
the qualification of strategic dumping will be satisfied. More fundamentally, given the agree-
ment among the SNG participants to adopt effective disciplines on government support
measures in the new Shipbuilding Agreement, the "heavy government support" itself will not
continue to exist in the shipbuilding industry.
79. Distortive Pricing Practices, supra note 11, 2.
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Even if there is pricing below "normal value" that leads to distor-
tions in the shipbuilding market, this is probably made possible by
government support measures, in light of the heavily subsidized nature
of the current shipbuilding industry. This, of course, can be addressed
directly by the support measure disciplines. In this regard, it should be
noted that the Secretariat has proposed a rather strict rule concerning
support measures which has a significantly wider scope of application
compared to the current WTO disciplines under the SCM Agreement.
80
Participants in this shipbuilding negotiation generally agree to adopt ef-
fective disciplines of government support measures.8
Only for the sake of completing this analysis, it is useful to make
two assumptions (which admittedly seem quite weak): (i) distortive low
pricing in the form of predatory/strategic dumping may actually occur in
the shipbuilding market; and (ii) distortive low pricing other than preda-
tory/strategic dumping may take place due to the governmental bestowal
of artificial advantages that would not fall within the definition of "sup-
port measures" under the new Shipbuilding Agreement. Only under these
assumptions, would the need for alternative mechanisms arise. Even so,
an alternative pricing mechanism would be justified only when it effec-
tively targets such low pricing practices alone.
For the discipline of predatory/strategic pricing, it is unnecessary and
inappropriate to adopt antidumping-type disciplines since the antidumping
rules are structurally designed to regulate pricing below normal value
rather than predatory/strategic pricing. An enforcement of competition law
would be a more appropriate approach since predatory/strategic pricing is
anticompetitive."
Should a pricing mechanism aimed at addressing non-
predatory/strategic distortive pricing borrow an antidumping model, "3 it
must equip itself with a filtering process. In other words, only if a ship-
builder obtained artificial advantages and thereby distorted normal
80. Support Measures, supra note 11, T 27.
81. See OECD SNG Meeting, supra note 14, at 7.
82. In one of its issue papers, the Secretariat pointed out some difficulties that may
confront the application of competition law for the shipbuilding industry. See Distortive Pric-
ing Practices, supra note 1I, 15-16. It notes that applying competition laws, which are
inherent to each country or group of countries, would result in different levels of protection
from one country to another, while pointing out additional problems on the enforcement side.
However, these problems can be resolved through bilateral or plurilateral arrangements that
can be struck at the SNG meetings. Although not easy, these arrangements seem more plausi-
ble particularly in the shipbuilding negotiation context, in light of the limited number of
participants and their shared interests. On the substantive side, only predatory/strategic pricing.
is at stake here. Thus, it seems relatively easier to reach an agreement on the required elements
of predatory/strategic pricing.
83. Again, this is an assumption for the sake of completing the analysis. As noted, this
attempt would be like putting a square peg into a round hole.
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competitive conditions, can low pricing be condemned under the pricing
mechanisms. In addition, a remedy should be granted only to a petitioner
who lacks the same level of artificial advantages as a targeted foreign
shipbuilder. If not, it would be contrary to the notion of a level playing
field, and would actually cause another distortion of competitive condi-
tions. That result is surely contrary to the Council's Mandate. This
additional filtering process is most necessary and relevant particularly in
the shipbuilding industry, since the current shipbuilders, regardless of
country location, are strongly protected by their governments. Ironically,
this suggests that the new Shipbuilding Agreement should have strong
disciplines constraining government support measures (subsidies),
whereas the antidumping-type pricing mechanisms should be carefully
approached.
V. CONCLUSION
It should be noted that the Mandate of the OECD Council is to re-
view and address market-distorting factors, including pricing practices
which distort normal competitive conditions. Its Mandate is not to revive
the 1994 Shipbuilding Agreement. As noted above, recent economic
studies demonstrate that low pricing in the form of international price
discrimination or below-cost sales is, more often than not, normal busi-
ness practice. This casts a serious doubt on the impetus for maintaining
the current WTO antidumping regime. Such a regime poses serious con-
cerns from the perspective of competition policy. In sum, the current
antidumping model is too problematic to serve as an archetype for spe-
cial disciplines in the shipbuilding industry. Moreover, the unique
character of the shipbuilding industry-for example, single worldwide
market-does not fit neatly into antidumping-type disciplines.
In light of the above, this Article concludes that the OECD Secre-
tariat's proposed pricing mechanism based on the 1994 IPC model is not
a viable option to address market-distorting pricing practices in the ship-
building industry. Regulation under pricing mechanisms based on such a
model will only aggravate the problems arising from the conflict be-
tween competition and trade. It would result in overregulation that is
likely to create an additional artificial distortion of the shipbuilding mar-
ket. This would be inconsistent with the OECD Council's Mandate, and
thus is not acceptable as an option.
Professor Willig's study of dumping shows that the only candidates
for market-distorting low pricing practices are predatory/strategic dump-
ing. Predatory/strategic dumping may occur under very limited
conditions, and the unique nature of the shipbuilding industry makes it
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very unlikely for "low pricing" in this industry to meet such conditions.
Even assuming that there are other types of market-distorting low pricing
practices in the shipbuilding industry, only those that were made possible
from granting artificial advantages should be the target of the pricing
mechanism. This is because pricing mechanisms, if any, can be justified
only when they are aimed at restoring normal competitive conditions to
the market. If a foreign shipbuilder has the ability to cut prices by a natu-
ral advantage arising from normal business practices, it should not be
deemed to be distorting pricing practices. For the various reasons stated
above, other industrial sectors are also strongly advised not to mimic this
antidumping-type discipline of pricing practices in the future.
Finally, the author wishes to make it clear that this Article is not in-
tended to deny the necessity of addressing market-distorting factors in
the shipbuilding industry. The shipbuilding market currently suffers from
distortions of normal competitive conditions due to its heavily subsi-
dized nature. Such distortions should be directly dealt with by effective
disciplines of government support measures themselves.
An ambitious desire to catch a suspect in a public park cannot justify
shooting a machinegun into a crowd; similarly, a pricing mechanism in
theory could supplement support measure disciplines, but runs the un-
tenably high risk of sanctioning efficient shipbuilders who set
''competitively low" prices rather than "unfairly low" prices.
[Vol. 24:807
